The Ontology of the Patent Law, Part II
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Illustration of "native" DNA in the human cell, from the majority opinion in Ass. for Mol. Path. v. Myriad Genetics, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit A few weeks ago, I wrote a post about a case the US Supreme Court will hear on April 15th concerning whether genes can be patented. As we get closer to that date, I want to pick up the thread where it was left off. As a quick reminder, the case before the court now concerns the validity of a patent that was granted to Myriad Genetics on a pair of genes (BRCA 1/2) whose presence has been shown to confer an increased risk of developing breast cancer. Here, I want to examine how this case turns on a difficult ontological question, namely: what kind of things are genes? A number of people who support Myriad’s patent argue that human genes ought to be understood as a molecule like any other. They are a material object, nothing more and nothing less. Others, including the co-discoverer of DNA’s molecular struct...